By most objective standards, the intelligence-sector reform that has taken place in South Africa since the end of apartheid seems to be a model success. Not only have the intelligence services gone from being militarized, highly repressive instruments of internal control to being seemingly transparent and democratically accountable civilian-led agencies designed to inform policy, but they have done so in a systematic manner that conforms to the policy prescriptions and theories of experts in the field of democratic transformation. From a theoretical standpoint, South Africa's transformation process is a political scientist's dream come true: Models were adapted to policy prescriptions, which in turn were codified into law and then operationalized as new structures and procedures. One can study where the South African intelligence sector stood during the apartheid era, discern how the transformation process was designed and implemented, and analyze the tangible results of these reforms on the intelligence sector.
forces and law enforcement. Many of the security-intelligence agencies 1 are descended from the Special Branch of the South African Police (SAP). From the beginning of the apartheid era in 1948, their main goal was to gather intelligence relating to internal-security threats posed by liberation movements, especially the African National Congress (ANC). The regime viewed the ANC as the gravest threat and as a body under Soviet control. This perception was enhanced by the Cold War international climate and the influence of the Afrikaner doctrine of Christian Nationalism internalized by both the ruling elites and the security officers who served them. Throughout the apartheid era, national-security policy focused primarily on combating the ANC and other communistsupported groups, whether inside the country or in neighboring states.
As internal and external resistance to apartheid increased and the threat of Soviet expansion in Africa grew, the intelligence agencies expanded in size and power. Officers from the SAP's Security Branch (SB) were seconded to the national civilian intelligence organizations, the Republican Intelligence and its successors, the Bureau for State Security (BOSS), the Department of National Security, and later the National Intelligence Service (NIS). These internal-security intelligence services and the Department of Military Intelligence were responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence, as well as conducting counterintelligence operations. Over time, elements of the Department of Information, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Railways Police Security Branch, and the Prisons Service also took up intelligence tasks. 2 Military officers seconded to internal-security-intelligence duties dominated this security-intelligence apparatus. These "securocrats," as they became known, flourished under the P.W. Botha administration , and the internal-security intelligence structures that they operated became the primary institutions which the National Party government used to maintain white-minority rule. The State Security Council (SSC), established in 1972, coordinated strategic intelligence policy under the chairmanship of the prime minister (known after 1984 as the state president) and included key cabinet ministers as well as senior military, intelligence, and police officials. The influence that the South African Defense Force (SADF) wielded over the SSC could be seen from the custom of naming generals with clandestine experience to the key post of SSC secretary-general. The SSC developed a "Total Strategy" to defeat the ANC through a mixture of welfare and security measures administered by a National Security Management System (NSMS) that reached into hundreds of neighborhoods, townships, and villages across South Africa. 
Policing and Praetorians
When Defense Minister P.W. Botha became president in 1975, the SADF gained in prominence and its Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) became the dominant intelligence agency, assuming responsibility for clandestine and covert operations from BOSS. Counterintelligence fell under the Police Security Branch. The DMI and SADF special forces mounted extensive covert operations against the liberation movements in both South Africa itself and the neighboring "frontline states." 4 Under Botha, right-wing "securocrats" from the DMI became the Praetorian Guards of the apartheid regime.
In modern liberal democracies, domestic security intelligence is usually a "high-policing" function assigned to a civilian agency such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States or the Security Service (MI5) in the United Kingdom. This was not the case in apartheid-era South Africa, where, as in most authoritarian regimes, the boundaries and functions of military-intelligence and police organizations overlapped and became indistinguishable from each other. The militarized security-intelligence services functioned more as "political police" than as "domestic intelligence bureaus" subject to ministerial control and legislative and judicial oversight. 5 Under Botha, they acquired greater autonomy from policy makers and became insulated from most legislative or judicial scrutiny. As the SADF and its DMI became more influential, they tended to be responsive to, and derived their powers and responsibilities from, the executive authority of the president and the SSC rather than legal mandates. The militarized security organs gathered political intelligence on thousands of people, usually related to subversion rather than specific criminal offenses. The DMI became the regime's chief weapon against political opposition and as such was a bulwark of white-minority rule.
By the time that President Botha's health failed and Frederik W. de Klerk replaced him in 1989, the military-dominated intelligence services had come to resemble an "independent security state" free of external controls on its activities. Unlike political police, who act at the behest of the rulers, an independent security state in effect sets its own agenda and may pursue goals other than those that the ruling elite wishes to pursue. Its funding and policies remain hidden from anyone outside the organization itself, which selects whatever targets it pleases for its information-gathering and countering activities. All these characteristics were present in the South African intelligence apparatus during apartheid's last decade.
As president, de Klerk was determined to bring this military-dominated independent security state under control in order to advance his political agenda of normalization, beginning with the lifting of a nationwide state of emergency dating to 1986 and the unbanning of the ANC and other opposition groups. Consequently, de Klerk moved to diminish the power of the NSMS by subordinating it to the NIS and placing it, along with the SSC staff, under civilian Deputy Information Minister Roelf Meyer.
Making the civilian-run NIS South Africa's premier intelligence organization was a key to ending the military preeminence established under Botha. Shaun McCarthy argues that during the last years of the apartheid era under de Klerk, the NIS "remained the most enlightened and least controversial" of the South African intelligence agencies. Botha's uniformed securocrats had given the NIS little active role in their covert campaign against the ANC, and the NIS was the intelligence agency most favorable toward political rather than military solutions. The NIS helped to make possible the early contacts between de Klerk's administration and ANC leaders. Robert Henderson maintains that de Klerk, first as a minister and member of the SSC under Botha, then later as president, both helped to shape intelligence requirements and shared in responsibility for the covert operations targeting the ANC and other organizations opposed to the apartheid regime. 6 However that may be, it is clear that once he became president, de Klerk tried to make the security-intelligence apparatus more accountable to his office, only to find that it had taken on the characteristics of an independent security state.
As apartheid waned during the early 1990s, de Klerk struggled to enact intelligence reform, only to find that secret units with hidden funding sources defied government control and oversight. The president was plagued by revelations of violent "Third Force" operations run by a network of former and current security operatives acting without official sanction. While some stories about these rogue elements came out as a result of court proceedings, South Africa's media had since the later Botha years played a significant role in exposing dubious intelligence activities. While embarrassing stories sometimes undermined de Klerk's negotiating position, the absence of effective legislative oversight left the media as the provider of the only real, even if sensationalized, intelligence oversight in South Africa.
The New Dispensation
With ANC leader Nelson Mandela's election as president of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in April 1994, South Africa entered a period of momentous transition that included the integration, reorientation, and reorganization of the intelligence and security sectors. Although the GNU included ministers from the National Party (including de Klerk as second vice-president) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), all the security portfolios (Defense, Safety and Security, Intelligence, Justice, and Foreign Affairs) were in ANC hands. This would have a profound effect on the future shape and course of the new South African intelligence community. The integration of the intelligence and security sectors would be the most daunting task.
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Discussions in 1993 between NIS and the ANC's Department of In-telligence and Security (DIS) led to proposals during the tenure of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) in early 1994 for legislation to transform the intelligence apparatus once the new GNU came to power. Recognizing that merely integrating the intelligence and security services would not necessarily do away with the independent security state that had grown up, the TEC's Sub-Council on Intelligence developed principles and guidelines to shape new laws and a new organizational structure. The guidelines sprang from an earlier set published in the ANC's Annual National Conference report of 1992. They reflected the desire to adhere to democratic principles and transparency and specified that the new intelligence community would be organized and governed by new legal mandates and would be subject to a code of conduct as well as held accountable by legislative oversight. 8 In developing a new intelligence "dispensation," the Sub-Council on Intelligence and GNU legislators and policy makers looked to the models of the British, Canadian, and Australian intelligence communities. The South Africans closely studied the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Australian Security Intelligence Act and adapted several of the organizational-structure, executive-control, and parliamentary-oversight features of both in their new intelligence legislation. The Canadians had been particularly concerned with issues of public accountability, while limiting the scope of the oversight process to avoid politicization of the intelligence community. The U.S. and British models apparently were viewed less favorably due to perceived problems in legislative oversight. 9 Considering the lack of effective legislative oversight under apartheid, it was only prudent for the GNU to make the institutionalization of such oversight a priority in the area of intelligence reform.
After taking office in May 1994, the GNU followed through on the TEC's efforts toward comprehensive intelligence reform with a White Paper on Intelligence that outlined the "philosophy, mission and role of intelligence in a democratic South Africa," with a "focus primarily on the mandates of the proposed new civilian services (domestic and foreign)." 10 In late 1994, the GNU passed the Intelligence Services Act creating the civilian National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South African Secret Service (SASS) to replace the existing apartheid-era services. The National Strategic Intelligence Act, passed at the same time, defined the functions of the national intelligence agencies and created a National Intelligence Coordinating Committee to replace the NIS, while another act created intelligence-oversight mechanisms. Later, the 1995 South African Police Services Act and the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy would address aspects of security intelligence pertaining to the police.
Because the interim constitution dealt with police and military restructuring but not intelligence overhaul, the White Paper on Intelligence became the key document for outlining the overarching philosophy, organizational structure, legal mandates, control and oversight mechanisms, code of conduct, and future policies for the new South African intelligence community. According to the White Paper, this community would be governed by principles such as: political neutrality; legislative sanction, accountability, and parliamentary control; a balance between secrecy and transparency; and the separation of intelligence from policy making. In addition, members of the intelligence services would be required to follow an ethical code of conduct that called for: allegiance to the constitution and other democratic institutions; subordination to the rule of law; compliance with democratic values; adherence to the principle of political neutrality; commitment to integrity, objectivity, and unbiased evaluation of information; and promotion of mutual trust between policy makers and intelligence professionals.
The White Paper also contained language that severely limited the use of covert operations both internally and externally. The 1996 postapartheid constitution stipulated the governing principles of the intelligence services as compliance with the rule of law (including international law), civilian executive control vested in the president, legislative regulation and oversight, transparency and accountability, political neutrality, and the duty of intelligence-service members to disobey illegal orders. 11 The GNU set about consolidating the intelligence community by integrating the former apartheid regime's intelligence and security apparatus with its counterparts from both the black homelands and the ANC's DIS. Before 1990, the ANC's intelligence apparatus had included directorates for counterintelligence and strategic intelligence analysis, as well as the military-intelligence wing of Umkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation" or MK), the ANC's military arm. Besides being bitter enemies, the organizations that the GNU was trying to meld together had differing ideologies, core competencies, operating procedures, and experiences. The existing South African intelligence services were tainted by their role as apartheid's guardians. The ANC services, trained by the Soviets and their clients, were rooted in unconventional warfare and were unaccustomed to performing the various tasks and functions required of sophisticated national intelligence agencies in a liberal democracy. The homeland intelligence and security services were a mixed bag of former lower-ranking SB and SADF members known for corruption. To the ANC, they seemed like nothing but an extension of the apartheid state.
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Current Structures
The South African intelligence community developed during the GNU period up through President Thabo Mbeki's reelection in 2004 re-sembled, with modifications, the British, Canadian, and Australian models. Executive control is vested in the president and passes through the Cabinet Committee for Security and Intelligence Affairs to the Ministry for Intelligence Services. The two civilian intelligence agencies, the NIA and SASS, are under the Minister of Intelligence. The NIA is charged with domestic intelligence and counterintelligence missions (similar to Britain's MI5), while the SASS conducts foreign intelligence activities (similar to MI6). The president appoints the directors of both agencies. Military intelligence under the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is separate and distinct from the civilian agencies. Within the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Crime Intelligence Division conducts criminal intelligence. Coordination between these agencies is handled by the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC), which consists of the intelligence coordinator-appointed by, and accountable to, the president-and the coordinator's staff as well as the top official from each intelligence agency.
The Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence sees to legislative oversight. The committee has powers to conduct investigations of intelligence-community activities, make recommendations on intelligence-related legislation, and control the accounts and financial statements of the intelligence services. An inspector-general for intelligence, appointed by two-thirds of the legislature, is authorized to have considerable access to intelligence information in order to conduct investigations and report to the Joint Standing Committee. The auditor-general and Standing Committee on Public Accounts monitor the intelligence budgets. In addition, a public protector and the Human Rights Commission provide additional protections from abuse of state power. 13 Judicial oversight is exercised primarily as a check on executive control over the legality of intelligence operations and through the resolution of legal actions brought against the government.
There are several other bodies that belong in this account. A National Security Council (NSC) was established in June 2000, and consists of the president, the deputy president, and the ministers of Safety and Security, Defense, Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance, and Justice, with other ministries participating as needed. The NSC's main jobs are to develop national-security policy and to ensure that cabinet committees coordinate around that policy. Nonstatutory and not a feature of the GNU, the Council seems designed to move the making of national-security policy out of the larger cabinet orbit. In addition to the NSC, there are interdepartmental Joint Operational and Intelligence Structures (Joints) that date to 1999 and link the NIA, SASS, SANDF, SAPS, and other government agencies in order to deal with internal-security issues.
The Ministry for Intelligence Services came into being in 1996 as the main office for the formulation of intelligence policy. Charged with guiding and directing the arduous intelligence-transformation process, the ministry is the executive office for civilian intelligence and performs the community-management function. A 1998 law puts the intelligence minister in charge of ensuring effective cooperation between the civilian intelligence services (NIA and SASS), SANDF, and the SAPS, in consultation with their ministers. Intelligence priorities for the ministry include: combating subversion, sabotage, terrorism, corruption, crime, and arms smuggling; conducting counterespionage; addressing domestic protective-security problems, regional security issues, stability issues in Africa, and international economic and technological threats directed at South Africa; preventing involvement of private security companies in African conflicts; and ensuring safety during local elections.
The intelligence coordinator and NICOC staff handle day-to-day coordination between the national intelligence agencies. The NICOC also produces and disseminates national strategic intelligence products to the president, the cabinet, the Cabinet Committee for Security and Intelligence Affairs, and other clients within the national and provincial governments. The NICOC has established Provincial Intelligence Coordination Committees (PICOCs) in the nine provinces and created several functional committees to facilitate coordination below the national level. The existence of provincial-level structures somewhat parallels the old NSMS, with the major difference that the postapartheid system is not dominated by the military.
In October 2001, the NIA created a Presidential Support Unit (PSU). Originally, it was designed to give the presidency logistical and support services such as secure communications and countermeasures against electronic surveillance when the president travels, but it has evolved into a 300-member unit with an official mandate to advise the presidency on strategies for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. The PSU is not supposed to collect intelligence itself.
14 However, the PSU's actual functions remain murky, and there are indications that it has become Mbeki's personal intelligence service.
The NIA, created by amalgamating the former NIS with DIS and the homeland intelligence services, is mandated by the National Strategic Intelligence Act of 1994 to gather, correlate, evaluate, and analyze domestic intelligence in order to identify any threat or potential threat to the security of South Africa, and to supply intelligence regarding such threats to the NICOC; to fulfill the national counterintelligence responsibility; to provide, where necessary, intelligence to the South African Police Service (SAPS) for the purposes of investigating alleged offences; and to gather and evaluate intelligence at the request of other interested departments of the government.
According to its legal mandate, the NIA's domestic-intelligence duties include: 1) threat indications and warnings; 2) analysis and monitoring of crises with a view to identifying "opportunities for the government"; 3) the national counterintelligence function, including offensive counterespionage; and 4) a departmental intelligence responsibility to offer help and liaison to other government departments requiring intelligence. The NIA also conducts security investigations, vets intelligence personnel and others for access to classified information, provides internal protective security and information-technology security for the government, develops security-standards policy, and assists other departments with the government's anticorruption campaign. The NIA has no law-enforcement powers, but does support SAPS with intelligence as needed and authorized. In 2000, the NIA underwent a further reorganization (probably related to the forming of the PICOCs) aimed at decentralizing intelligence activities into the provinces in order better to focus on domestic-security threats.
The mission of the Secret Service is to gather, evaluate, and analyze foreign intelligence (excluding foreign military intelligence) and to conduct counterintelligence operations outside the country. The SASS received the "cream of the crop" of personnel from the old NIS and DIS. Despite this, the SASS intelligence products reportedly are not held in high regard by Mbeki, which may account for the formation of the PSU. Counterespionage is likely to be a priority function for the Secret Service.
Tackling the Crime Problem
The South African Police Service (SAPS) reports to the Ministry of Safety and Security and is the primary domestic-security service. It is a national force, with approximately 149,000 personnel (including 33,000 civilians) spread across all nine provinces. During the transformation period, it faced a significant problem with personnel competency, since an estimated one-fourth of police officers were functionally illiterate. Insufficient and low-quality personnel, corruption in the service, low morale, and frequent murders of police officers remained problems within the force for years. Crime remains a serious national-security problem in South Africa, and the SAPS is on the front line of the government's National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) campaign to stabilize crime rates, particularly in designated "hot spots." The Directorate of Special Operations, better known as "the Scorpions," is the leading SAPS crimefighting unit, reportedly modeled on the FBI.
The Crime Intelligence Division (CID) of the SAPS is responsible for collecting and analyzing crime intelligence as well as counterintelligence related to criminal matters, and for providing intelligence and technical support to crime-prevention and investigative efforts. Crime Intelligence is the fastest growing program in the Safety and Security budget. The CID has been involved in cross-border operations such as Operation Rachel in Mozambique, which focused on the destruction of arms caches. To support the NCCS, the division is shifting its emphasis from reactive to proactive intelligence designed to detect suspected criminal activities before a crime has been committed. The Crime Intelligence Division does conduct covert actions, and is regulated by the constitution, the SAPS Act of 1995, the National Strategic Intelligence Act of 1994, the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act of 1992, and the White Paper on Intelligence. While not militarized or integrated into the security-intelligence network to the degree seen during the apartheid era, the SAPS does have representatives in the Joints and PICOCs, and its minister sits on the NSC. The commissioner of the Crime Intelligence Division represents the SAPS on the NICOC.
In the transformation of South Africa's intelligence sector, demilitarization has been a key goal. By dismantling the "securocrat" structure, creating a civilian-led Defense Department, and limiting the scope of military intelligence to the functions specified in the 1994 National Strategic Intelligence Act, the GNU and its successor, an ANC-IFP coalition government, achieved that goal. The Act limits Defense Intelligence (or DI, formerly the Military Intelligence Division) to collecting, correlating, evaluating, and using foreign and domestic military intelligence, and conducting counterintelligence within the SANDF. The DI is banned from collecting nonmilitary intelligence and from covert collection except under specific circumstances limited by law, and only when authorized by the national intelligence coordinator with the concurrence of the NICOC and cabinet. The DI is forbidden from participating in any operations not related to intelligence, and the SANDF as a whole has no powers of arrest, detention, or search and seizure under the new constitution. Yet the DI is involved in supporting the two highestpriority Defense Department missions: controlling the borders and cooperating with SAPS for internal security. Neither SAPS nor the SANDF is at ease with what amounts to military involvement in police functions, but until SAPS can show itself able to tackle these jobs alone, the SANDF will remain a major player in internal security. Oversight of the DI is shared between the mechanisms designed for the intelligence community and an inspector-general for defense intelligence.
So far, we have discussed formal legal and institutional changes and the redrawing of organizational charts. These matter, but are hardly the whole story. Since the creation of the ANC-IFP ruling coalition and Thabo Mbeki's election to the presidency as Mandela's successor in 1999, subtle but significant changes have come to the intelligence community. Not all of these bode well for the high standards set by the new laws and constitution. Above all, Mbeki's placement of old comrades from the ANC's former intelligence network into virtually every key security-sector position has worried some observers.
Moreover, the extent of effective intelligence oversight has become a concern. The post of inspector-general of intelligence lacks a clear role or set of reporting channels, and has remained mostly vacant for the last decade. One recent incumbent, Fazel Randera, resigned in January 2002 after only six months on the job. While he cited personal grounds for leaving, reports indicate that his real reason was the untenability of having to confront an intelligence community with close ties to the presidency. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the IFP leader and former homeaffairs minister, has questioned whether oversight is truly independent and has said that top ANC figures are "untouchable."
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Amendments to the intelligence acts were enacted in 2002. While some of the new provisions clarified ambiguities in the earlier laws, critics saw signs in the amendment package that the government was moving to make the intelligence services less transparent and accountable to parliamentary and judicial oversight. 16 While Mbeki and his lieutenants would no doubt not welcome the comparison, the NSC and the new Presidential Support Unit have been starting to look and function more like the old apartheid regime's Cabinet Committee for State Security and its subordinate SSC. If this trend continues and the security-intelligence sector begins to backslide into a "political police" mode of operation, owing its allegiance to Mbeki and the ANC rather than the constitution, South Africa's democratization process will be in jeopardy. In time-perhaps with a change of generations-a new South African identity will emerge. But until then, the old comrades of the ANC are likely to shape the intelligence-reform process to their benefit.
Lessons Learned
The South African case shows that intelligence-sector reform is a key element of the democratization process. In the overall progression of democratization, intelligence reform should begin earlier rather than later. The South Africans developed a road map of where they wanted to take these reforms through a White Paper, which outlined why reform was necessary, what the intelligence-community structure would look like, where the intelligence functions were to be distributed, to whom the various agencies would be accountable, and how the agencies and their personnel were expected to act. Working from this outline, South African legislators crafted legal mandates to govern the operation of the intelligence community, balancing security with transparency, establishing legislative oversight, building in civilian control, and separating intelligence from policy making.
Operationalizing these mandates has proven to be harder than expected. Integrating, amalgamating, and transforming a variety of intelligence agencies that were once mortal enemies into a cohesive and efficient community is a long-term undertaking. The professionalization of the intelligence community is the key to success, and that aspect has been a struggle for the South Africans. It took several years to purge the old-guard white "securocrats," and it is likely to take quite a bit longer to replace the Soviet-trained ANC group that is now in control. After a two-year hiatus, the intelligence community late in 2002 established the South African National Academy of Intelligence (SANAI) to provide training to members of the NIA, SASS, NICOC, and PSU as well as the military's DI and the SAPS. The graduates of the SANAI are the future of the South African intelligence community, but it will be years before they rise to the top.
A practical problem for most emerging democracies involves the organizational dynamics of transforming a bureaucracy. One of the most persistent arguments against reforming intelligence agencies is that the transformation process will leave the nation vulnerable to both internal and external threats. In most organizations, a radical transformation process will inherently bring on a period during which the organization's efficiency drops. This certainly happened in South Africa. The goals during the transformation process were to limit the decline in efficiency while minimizing the time that it would take for the organization to recover.
As a former South African senator has observed, a dilemma arises when efficiency drops and seems to stagnate rather than improving toward the level of the old organization. A common reaction to this problem-intensified, in the case of intelligence agencies, by the realization that they exist to counter what may be grave and urgent threats-is to try to reorganize again specifically in order to improve efficiency. The result, at least at first, will be yet another dip in performance as the agency adapts to the latest round of changes. The problem can become systemic if the agency's leadership fails to grasp the rhythm of the change-inefficiency-efficiency sequence and denies the organization sufficient time to adapt and gradually improve efficiency before more changes are made. Consider that the South African intelligence community underwent at least three major reorganizations in just over a decade: first under de Klerk in 1989, then during the GNU period, and finally after 2000 under Mbeki. In addition, most of the agencies endured numerous internal reorganizations and amalgamations during the same period. Unless the government gives these agencies time to adjust and develop standing operating procedures, they are unlikely to reach their optimal level of efficiency for a long time.
South Africa is the regional leader for the southern half of Africa, and Mbeki served as the first president of the new African Union. At present, South Africa neither faces any significant external threat, nor is it inclined to pose a threat to its neighbors. South Africa remains the key to regional stability, and after a long period of apartheid-induced isolation and the difficult process of internal political transformation, it is beginning to take on more of a leadership role in Africa.
South Africa has made a remarkable transformation of its securityintelligence sector from what had clearly become an independent security state during the later stages of the apartheid regime to a bureau of domestic intelligence under the GNU. However, with the consolidation of the ANC's hold on power, the Mbeki administration has shown a tendency to inch the security-intelligence services toward a politicalpolice mode of operation. Rather than being dominated by the military "securocrats," the new intelligence community is dominated by ANC veterans-mostly trained in the former Soviet Union, East Germany, or Cuba and virtually all with a history of common service in the ANC's intelligence wing during the long struggle against the apartheid regime. The placement of so many key security-sector positions in the hands of communist-trained former intelligence operatives is a remarkable exception to the general trend in new democracies. The ANC's domination of the public sector calls into question the efficacy of governmental-oversight mechanisms, particularly in the intelligence and security sectors, and the potential emergence of a single-party state does not augur well for democracy. How South Africa consolidates its democracy is being closely watched by other emerging democracies, and its relative success or failure will affect both the region and the continent beyond.
NOTES
derived from a legal charter or statute. It has low autonomy and low penetration of society. "Political police" have greater autonomy from democratic policy making and are more insulated from legislative and judicial scrutiny than a bureau of domestic intelligence. This type of security-intelligence service responds almost exclusively to the political elites or party in power. An "independent security state" is a security-intelligence service characterized by a lack of external controls and oversight, even from the authoritarian regime that it is supposedly protecting. It differs from the political police because it determines its own goals, which may not coincide with those of the political elite.
